Anti-Semitism on the Temple Mount. Zalman Shoval

Since 1967, all Israeli governments have employed balanced, carefully thought out policies on the Temple Mount in order to avoid any major conflicts with the Muslim world, and this is still the right approach to take.

In the arrangement made at the time with senior Palestinian Muslim clerics, Israel agreed, despite the heart-breaking pain, to prohibit Jewish prayer on the Temple Mount, and it granted, with certain limitations, autonomy to the Waqf to manage the area. Alongside that, it was promised that Jews, and people of other religions, had full rights to visit any part of the Temple Mount, including the two main shines: Al-Aqsa mosque and the Dome of the Rock. Twenty-seven years later, when the peace agreement with Jordan was made, the Hashemite Kingdom was also promised special status on the Temple Mount.

However, while Israel has maintained its side of these agreements, the Palestinians have violated them almost since day one, both in their words and in their actions: From throwing stones and physically harassing groups of visitors, to using the front portion of the Temple Mount to attack Jews praying at the Western Wall below.

If in the beginning, these were thought to be sporadic actions, it later became more and more clear that the Palestinian political and religious leadership was behind the riots (with the help of Islamists among the Israeli Arab population, and yes, Arab MKs as well). The Palestinians, time has revealed, are not only against the agreement made in 1967, but are essentially against the right of the Jewish people to be in the place that has been most holy -- both nationally and religiously -- to them for all of history.

A clear expression of this sentiment can be found in the recent words of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, who in his speech at the International Conference for the Defense of Jerusalem, called on Palestinians to stop settlers (?) "from entering the [Temple Mount] compound by any means. This is our Aqsa [mosque] ... and they have no right to enter it and desecrate it."

The use of the word "desecrate" shows the racist, anti-Semitic character of his remarks, and by the way, Abbas is not the first or only person to speak this way. Before him, among others, there was Dr. Ali Jarbawi, a former Palestinian Authority minister and now a political science professor at Birzeit University, who, in a tendentious and false article in The New York Times, argued that former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount "triggered the Second Intifada," as if his very presence was an invasion of the sacred place.

In other words, contrary to the approach of the Christian churches, which welcomes people of other religions, or the Jewish approach, which does not see anything wrong with Christians and Muslims in its holy places, in the eyes of Abbas and Jarbawi, Jewish presence "desecrates" the sacred places of Islam.

Ironically, in Islam, there is actually a tradition of desecrating holy places -- not just one carried out by the Islamic State group and the Taliban -- but also by the Palestinians who desecrated, and continue to vandalize, Jewish graves on the Mount of Olives, and who destroyed synagogues in the Old City. Not to mention that throughout the entire Jordanian occupation, Jews were not allowed to visit the Western Wall.

Statements like Abbas' put Israel's tolerance for the Temple Mount partnership, both in principle and in practice, in a difficult position and raise questions as to the future of the agreement made in 1967. This is an unfortunate and alarming development that cannot be ignored, even when aiming for a comprehensive political agreement with the Palestinians and the Arab world.

Over the years, several proposals have bee made for a solution to the problematic reality on the Temple Mount, but with this atmosphere of extremism, it is doubtful whether it will be possible to implement them in the near future.

U.S. President Says Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Not the Root of the Region's Problems - Zalman Shoval

Seeing is believing

It was clear before U.S. President Barack Obama's speech to the U.N. General Assembly last week that it would not be routine and would not rehash the standard and familiar positions about America's place and role among the family of nations. The cause for this was the crisis in Ukraine, but mainly the Islamic State's advance in Syria and Iraq and the countermeasures taken by the president, which he said were to "degrade and destroy" the radical Islamist organization. While the U.S.-led coalition's military campaign against the Islamic State is still being waged on a rather limited scale, for Obama and his well-documented apprehension of American over involvement in international conflicts, this is was a watershed moment -- certainly when compared to the "lead from behind" slogan he has championed in the past.

When Obama touched on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in his speech, it initially appeared he would settle for repeating the usual mantras, like "the status quo is not sustainable," "America will not give up on the pursuit of peace" and others. Obama, after all, said that "the violence engulfing the region today has made too many Israelis ready to abandon the hard work of peace," but that the world and region "will be more just and more safe with two states living side by side, in peace and security." However, he then surprised and said what no American president before him has agreed to say, certainly not in such an explicit manner: "The situation in Iraq and Syria and Libya should cure anybody of the illusion that the Arab-Israeli conflict is the main source of problems in the region. For far too long, that's been used as an excuse to distract people from problems at home."

When I read this in the official and complete version of the speech, I could not believe my eyes. For many years now Israel's public relations and policy efforts have focused, without much success, on shattering the claim that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the root of all the problems in the Middle East, not to mention America's problems with the Arab world, when comes along none other than President Obama with an outright and emphatic statement, the interpretation of which can clearly mean only one thing -- that we have been right all along. No longer will we hear that "the road to Baghdad runs through Jerusalem," as argued by Zbigniew Brzezinski, former President Jimmy Carter's national security adviser; no longer will we have to hear that "American soldiers are risking their lives in Iraq and Afghanistan because the Palestinian problem has not been resolved," as stated by former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and General David Petraeus, the former head of the CIA; no longer will we have to contend with those evil and targeted insinuations against Israel, whereby it is the primary and sometimes even the sole party responsible for all the bad things that have happened and are happening in this part of the world.

It is possible Obama's motives for saying these things were partially utilitarian and political: Midterm elections are at the door, and the thesis alleging the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the source of all the region's woes does little but highlight America's lack of success, at least in the eyes of some observers, to foster a resolution. It is also possible that the president and his advisers have simply arrived at the logical and necessary conclusion that the spreading chaos in the Middle East, which also threatens to spill over into Europe and the U.S., is too severe and dangerous for them to continue hiding behind the excuse provided by the Palestinian issue.

Be the reason as it may, in any case it is a significant achievement for Israel's policy and public relations. We must not, in the meantime, delude ourselves into believing that people will not try reintroducing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, specifically Israel's role in it, to the diplomatic discourse. Regardless, even if this does happen, the significance of Obama's declaration will not be easily erased.

One person who is undoubtedly unhappy about Obama's speech is Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, who never misses an opportunity to howl out that the world is liable to forget the Palestinian problem due to the ISIS problem. It is even possible that Abbas' hate-filled speech was also connected to his anger at Obama: Even though Obama clarified, as stated, that the Palestinian issues was still on the agenda, perhaps that very integral part of Obama's speech was a signal that Washington has decided to look at things proportionately and hinted it no longer intends to support Abbas' "new" peace plan of unilaterally turning to the U.N. Security Council. In any case, one can also see the harsh condemnation of Abbas' speech by the State Department as affirmation of this conjecture.

Zalman Shoval - Hamas: Dead man walking

"Dead Man Walking" is a movie about a man on death row. It also describes the situation Hamas is in: The execution has been delayed, but not commuted. It's still "walking," hoping that diplomatic pressure on Israel and threats of resumed violence will save it.

But last Wednesday, when the leaders of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad thought that the IDF was returning to Gaza in full force, they realized that the game was lost and folded. Islamic Jihad deputy head Ziad Nahala actually expressed this clearly, saying, "The war is behind us. There's no choice -- we have to reach an agreement."

It seems there is some disagreement within Hamas. While the battered leadership in the Gaza Strip is leaning toward a long-term truce, political bureau chief Khaled Mashaal in his hotel suite in Doha and speaker Osama Hamadan in Beirut are still doing their best to throw a wrench into the negotiations.

This isn't the time for a final summation, but it can already be said that most of Israel's security goals in Operation Protective Edge were achieved, or will be: The attack tunnels were destroyed and rocket attacks on Israel have failed, and that failure will have clear ramifications not only on Hamas' capabilities but also in terms of deterring possible plans of other terrorist entities in the region. Moreover, the rocket fire only strengthened Israel's social and national fortitude instead of breaking it.

Another result: Instead of Hamas winning the support of the Arab world, it was mostly snubbed. And possibly most important when looking ahead, the residents of Gaza themselves have begun to express doubts, sometimes out loud and even to foreign journalists, about their fate under the Hamas regime. Besides all this, and particularly in light of the improvement in Hamas fighters' operations, we should of course note the excellence and superiority at all levels of the IDF: soldiers and officers, regular service and reservists, religious and secular.

But the Gaza Strip still hasn't been demilitarized, and Israel has to make do with evasive references to that issue. We can hope that oversight of the border crossings in cooperation with an international presence and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas' security forces can prevent, to some extent, the terrorists from replenishing their weapons arsenal. But that's not enough, and Israel should continue to demand full demilitarization as a precondition for any inclusive deal about other matters, including rehabilitating Gaza.

If it is adopted, the agreement currently in the works will leave Hamas without significant gains, but the group will certainly proclaim victory, as the Arab side does in every war, even when it's clear to everyone that it was beaten. It won't get an air or sea port either, and as far as removing the "blockade" (which was only ever partial and mainly focused on preventing weapons smuggling), Israel will insist -- hopefully with backing from the European Union and the U.S. -- that the existing limitations remain in effect.

If Hamas and Islamic Jihad gained anything -- and they did, especially in the diplomatic and international public relations arena -- it was because television shows the results, or the destruction and the casualties, not the reasons that led to the war and brought such a bitter fate on the heads of the residents of Gaza.

The anti-Semitic reflex in parts of the Western world, from the Right and in recent years mainly from the Left, also helped Hamas. So did the unilateral anti-Israel stance of the U.N., from the secretary general on down and the needless tension between Israel and the American administration, which resulted among other things from the fact that Washington still doesn't understand that Israel's war on Hamas and Islamic Jihad is part of the bigger struggle of the free world against the jihadism of ISIS, al-Qaida, and other Islamist forces that threaten America's security and values.

However, our reasoning is not necessarily that of Hamas, and we cannot rule out the possibility that the kamikaze mentality will lead it, despite some internal calls, to return to violence. In that case, Israel's answer must be clear: We gave diplomacy and negotiations a chance -- this time our response will be crushing.

Time to upgrade the US-Israel strategic relationship ZALMAN SHOVAL

As a senior US military commander recently put it: “among all our military allies, I admire the Israelis most of all.”

A few days ago, the Haaretz newspaper ran an article under the headline “US think tank: Obama should rethink military aid to Israel.” The headline, together with the subheadline, give the erroneous impression that a reportpublished by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington entertains doubts about the benefits of the US-Israel strategic relationship in general, and about the case for continued military aid to Israel in particular. However, this isn’t quite what the report says.(Full disclosure here: I am a member of the InternationalAdvisory Board of CSIS).

In fact, one of the report’s fundamental conclusions is that the US-Israeli strategic partnership serves the interests of both countries. That is to say, “as uncertainty dominates the Middle East, Israel is a stable state and important ally.” Actually, the report argues – not very convincingly – that it would be in Israel’s interest to reduce its dependence on US military aid.

On the whole, the report tries, with success, to be balanced, but one cannot escape the feeling that some of the theses expounded in it were overly influenced by the view prevalent in parts of the Washingtonian foreign policy establishment, namely that the Israel-Palestinian conflict and the failure to solve it are the key elements influencing the strategic relationship.

They aren’t, and they never were. For as important as solving the conflict is on its own merits, it wouldn’t make the challenges and threats facing America and Israel in today’s Middle East any less grave. In fact, most of the wars and upheavals in the region since World War II were only marginally, if at all, related to this issue.

True, there are a variety of opinions both in America and in Israel about certain aspects of the strategic relationship (though in Israel the number of naysayers is infinitesimal), nor is there much evidence, as the Haaretz article seems to maintain, that “more Americans now challenge both Israel’s political values and its strategic value.”

In fact most surveys demonstrate that there are more indications to the contrary – while the appreciation of Israel’s enhanced value for America’s strategic calculations is also supported by major parts of the US military, let alone Congress. This view became even more pronounced when it transpired that the end of the “Cold War” did not bring about the much touted “end of history” but rather the rise of a new and not lesser threat: Jihadism and Islamist terrorism.

One of the central premises of the report is that “popular revolts” in the Middle East signal an era of heightened instability; true, but it is precisely this reality which underscores the importance of America’s strategic relationship with its only remaining and fully committed ally in the region, Israel. America still has vital interests in the wider Middle East, and only time will tell whether the above events will ultimately create a more democratic, liberal and peaceful Middle East or, conversely, a more xenophobic and fundamentalist one. The omens are not very good, and, in any case, there is scant doubt that both America and Israel will face new threats and uncertainties.

THE PRESENT goings-on at the UN with regard to unilateral statehood for the Palestinians can be seen as an attempt not only to delegitimize Israel but also to diminish and undermine America’s role as a dominant player in the Middle East. US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta recently visited Israel for important consultations, including talks on the growing danger from a rapidly nuclear-going Iran. Judging by his statements, Mr. Panetta correctly recognizes the dangerous reality of Israel’s growing isolation in the Middle East, but not the reason for it – that major parts of the Arab and Muslim worlds still refuse to come to terms with its very existence or even its right to exist. Thus the Palestinians’ refusal to acknowledge Israel as the state of the Jewish people.

The debate on whether the core of the American-Israeli special relationship is shared values or strategic interests has been going on for many years. During Israel’s first years of existence there were those in Washington, including in the Pentagon, the CIA and the defense establishment in general who held that American support for the Jewish State contravened American strategic, geopolitical and economic interests (oil!) in the Middle East. Furthermore, little Israel was anyway too weak to cope with the supposed military superiority of the Arabs.

In those years Israel received no American military aid, nor was it even allowed to buy the weapons it needed in the United States. All that profoundly changed with the Six Day War, which demonstrated that Israel was in fact a major regional military force, including in the context of the Cold War. From being a strategic liability in the eyes of Washington, Israel had, in the span of six days, become perhaps not quite the “land-based aircraft carrier,” but definitely an important strategic asset.

In the present situation, America looks around and what does it see? Egypt, one of its former major allies in the Arab world, is still in the frame, but the relative weakness of the reigning military leadership and the almost certain rise of Islamic fundamentalism there raises serious questions about the future of that relationship. Iran long ago turned from friend to foe and Iraq, despite America’s efforts and sacrifices, may go the same way. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States do share America’s and Israel’s concerns, but their diminished confidence in the former’s political and strategic decisions in the region may negatively impact their willingness to get out on a limb.

Turkey? Ankara is still an important strategic ally as far as Washington is concerned, although its government’s behavior in international affairs, and its neo-Ottoman designs, have made this relationship problematic, to say the least.

Actually US-Israel defense-related cooperation is doing very well, but the present (and future) Middle East political roller-coaster gives ample reason for an additional upgrading of the relationship, including on such matters as enlarging the pre-positioning of US military arms and equipment in Israel, joint strategic and tactical exercises, etc. This in addition to the already existing important cooperation, benefitting both partners, in the fields of technology, intelligence, etc. The importance for Israel and for stability and peace in the Middle East in all this cannot be overstated, this being an aspect which Israeli policy makers must bear in mind, but nor should the strategic value of the relationship for the US be disregarded.

Palestinian statehood by Zalman Shouval

As expected, President Barack Obama's representatives, White House official Dennis Ross and Middle East envoy David Hale, returned to Washington empty-handed after efforts to prevent the Palestinians' unilateral declaration of statehood at the United Nations bore no fruit. One can assume that the American envoys were not especially surprised by this, since from the outset, the main goal of their visit was for the Palestinians to understand the grave nature of their refusal and the negative consequences it would have for their relations with the United States.

As I wrote here a few weeks ago, it is obvious that the only possible formula for renewing negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians would be a combination of what Obama said in his two speeches on the subject. One speech set out the basis for setting the future borders of the Palestinian state along the 1967 "borders" with additional "agreed upon land swaps." The second element lies in the details of a speech presented to AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee) in which Obama clarified his previous comments, and stated that the starting point for talks would not be the 1967 borders, but rather that the sides would hold negotiations on the outline of a new border. This latter version is the same formula that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton presented to the international Quartet.

The Palestinians outright rejected the proposal, while Israel accepted it, not withstanding certain reservations. It is possible to speculate about what caused the Obama administration, which we know does not always see eye to eye with Israel on various diplomatic issues, to behave with such positive determination. The fact is, however, that the administration has not really budged from its original position.

What the Americans today understand, unlike the Left in Israel who expresses its support for the Palestinians' unilateral declaration of statehood, is that the Palestinian Authority made this strategic decision in order not to enter into real negotiations with Israel. All of their diplomatic and political moves up until now stem from this avoidance behavior. The nature of negotiations is compromise and mutual concessions, including but not exclusive to refugees, Jerusalem and borders.

Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and his associates, like Yasser Arafat in his day, are not planning to go down in the Arab history books as the ones who were ready to compromise. Especially not when they believe that the detour they are taking at the United Nations will bring about the desired results. The Palestinians know that the Security Council will refuse to recognize the state they seek, even potentially without need for an American veto. Thus they decided on a move that can be characterized as the "Vatican option," meaning that the U.N. General Assembly, in which they have an automatic majority, grants them a new international, legal and diplomatic status. Instead of their current status as "observers," they will earn the same status as the Vatican, a "non-member observer state."

To the average person on the street, this would appear to be a semantic game; however, in actuality there is a multi-faceted, real-world difference here. The key word is, of course, "state." The moment this word appears in the title, all the rest becomes irrelevant. It is a "state," despite missing some of the characteristics of a normal state; first and foremost, sovereign control over its land. The Palestinian "state" could, for example, call for international agreements with other states, including security alliances; be elected as a full member of different international organizations; and gravest of all for Israel, it could join The International Court of Justice in The Hague and turn it into a theater for incessant claims against Israel, its soldiers and its citizens.

Moreover, even without an agreement between Fatah and Hamas, there is no doubt that Hamas and all the other radical Palestinian organizations will be fully present in the new "state," be it through actual presence in government institutions or "only" on the ground.

This state could become a terrorist enemy that will force Israel to act militarily and in other ways in order to cope with the security threats it constantly produces. Abbas claims that after the state is established, it will renew negotiations with Israel. This is transparent trickery, as the main topics that would have been discussed in negotiations, which were already so difficult, would be considered "water under the bridge" by then.

For some time now, Israel has been examining different ways to find a correct and realistic answer to the Palestinians' plans and the threats posed by them, if possible before "zero hour" at the U.N. arrives, as well as how to deal with the situation that may arise afterwards. In this same vein, the current close relationship with the United States and the coordination of Israel's and the U.S.'s positions, are a central and essential barrier in the face of the calamities on the way. And if someone still doesn't understand the supreme importance of Israel's connection to America, one just need think about the events in Cairo over the weekend.

U.S.-Israel Relations after the American Midterm Elections by Zalman Shoval

• After the end of the Cold War, Tom Friedman wrote that this meant the end of the strategic relationship, that America does not need Israel anymore since the Soviet Union is no longer there. In fact, the dangers from Muslim fundamentalism and terrorism may be greater than those of the Soviet Union. The Islamists seek to change the world, to create a new situation wherein the free Western democratic world will be under the thumb of a revived Islamism.
  
• In the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, America has never changed its positions on Jerusalem, borders, and settlements, although over the years there have been different points of emphasis. Even the Bush-Baker Administration never declared the settlements to be illegal. As construction in the territories and Jerusalem continued at full strength, the U.S. and Israel agreed that certain amounts were to be deducted from U.S. loan guarantees - an example of how things can be worked out in spite of the basic position of the United States.
  
• In the U.S. 2010 midterm elections, almost all the members of the unofficial Jewish caucus, who are mostly Democrats, were re-elected. This means that their proportionate weight inside the Democratic group in the House of Representatives is actually greater than it was in the past.
  
• Israel does not want to see a weakened American presidency, which means a weakened America, especially in the Middle East where the only possible alternative to a weakened America is a strengthened Iran.
  
• The Palestinians now want the UN Security Council to adopt a new resolution which will supersede Resolution 242. It will not mention secure borders or that Israel is not required to withdraw from all the territories. If the proposal passes, this would create a new reality and put an end to the peace process, which depends on the agreed formula of 242. If this is done away with, neither peace nor any sort of interim solution is likely.

The Beginning of the U.S.-Israel Relationship

An overview of the relationship between Israel and America must start from before the beginning, when Zionist leaders in Israel (then called Palestine) realized during and after World War II that America was going to be the center of decision-making and they shifted the center of Zionist activity from London to New York and Washington.

Although President Franklin Roosevelt was supported by a large majority of the Jewish community, there were also more than a few downsides - the St. Louis ship affair, for example [when in 1939, 930 mainly German Jewish refugees were turned away from U.S. shores]. There was Breckinridge Long, appointed by President Roosevelt as Assistant Secretary of State with jurisdiction over immigration and refugee issues during World War II, until his demotion in 1944 for withholding thousands of visas intended for Jewish refugees.

After the war, and because of the Holocaust and the problem of displaced persons, and the Exodus ship being sent back to Germany, there was growing awareness and pressure in America to support the establishment of a Jewish state. In America, contrary to Europe, paradoxically, there was and still is a certain feeling of moral responsibility for what happened to the Jews during World War II, and as a result their cause was one to be supported.

Not that there were no problems. There was a U.S. arms embargo on Israel. Even after the War of Independence had started, Israel could not legally acquire arms. There was a traditional attitude in the CIA, among others, which also came to the fore on the eve of the Six-Day War, that Israel had no chance of winning against all those Arab armies and therefore America should not get involved. There were others who said that Israel was going to be a Soviet satellite because of Ben-Gurion, who headed a socialist party, and therefore Americans should be wary.

Ben-Gurion was aware of the paramount importance of the relationship with the United States. In 1950 he proposed sending a unit of the Israeli Army to fight alongside the Americans in Korea, not for military but for political purposes. It is often forgotten that until 1967, Israel got scarcely any foreign aid from America. There was Jewish aid and some insignificant funds for agricultural development, but no large-scale civilian or military aid. When Ben-Gurion wanted to buy American planes, looking ahead to a confrontation with Egypt, the U.S. would not sell them. America also put pressure on Canada not to sell to Israel either, so the only source of arms was France, and before that, during the War of Independence, it was Czechoslovakia.

Israel Becomes a Strategic Asset to the U.S.

The U.S.-Israel relationship changed with the Six-Day War, when Israel became a strategic asset, a country which could win wars against all odds. It was a reliable ally in the Cold War, serving America's strategic interests. This went beyond the military side of the relationship with the growth of political, cultural, and economic relationships. Indeed, even today, the defense-related cooperation between Israel and the Obama Administration is probably unprecedented, in a positive sense.

This so-called special relationship was based on strategic interests, a perception of Israel as a strategic partner, and on shared values. The shared values include democracy - Israel is the only democracy in the region - rule of law, the justice system, and last but not least, the Bible.

After the end of the Cold War, Tom Friedman wrote a column saying that this meant the end of the strategic relationship, that America does not need Israel anymore since the Soviet Union is no longer there. In fact, the dangers which have been growing over the years from Muslim fundamentalism and terrorism and the threat to Western civilization as a whole may be a greater danger than the Soviet Union presented. It amazes me that there is not sufficient recognition in America today of this major threat to itself, to the West, and, of course, to Israel.

There is an attitude in the current administration that al-Qaeda is really something out of the ordinary in the Muslim world and if America eliminates al-Qaeda and kills Osama bin Laden, the problem will be over. But it is a much bigger issue. Of course there are moderate Muslims and moderate Muslim Arab states which have a basic interest in fighting extremism, but their voice is not sufficiently heard. What stands behind the Islamist approach is a drive to change the world, not to reach an agreement but to create a new situation wherein the free Western democratic world will be under the thumb of a revived Islamism. The exclusive concentration on al-Qaeda is counterproductive because Iran is probably at least as bad a factor in international worldwide terrorism as al-Qaeda.

Israel Helps to Stabilize the Middle East

There is the view that the Israeli-Palestinian dispute is the heart of the problem in the Middle East, that the road to Baghdad leads through Jerusalem, and unless that issue is eliminated - implying pressure on Israel - then America will continue to face insurmountable problems in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the Arab world. 

I do not accept the position that if the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would be solved, the problems which America faces in the Middle East will go away. On the contrary, there is quite a distinct possibility that Iran and its supporters will say that was stage one, and now comes stage two. They are not only against Israel being in the territories, but against Israel as a whole. If you listen to politicians in the moderate Arab world, you will hear the theme that if America would put the Iranian issue first, then other issues will be easier to solve. However, the official attitude is still to solve the Palestinian-Israeli issue and then successfully tackle Iran.

One could also make the case that Israel is actually a factor of stability in the Middle East. Without a strong Israel we might not have the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan at this point. Paradoxically, we might not even have a Palestinian national movement because if it had not been for a strong Israel, the Palestinians might have ended up as a department of the Baath Party in Syria. Israel also played a role in changing the attitude of President Sadat with regard to Egypt's previously close relationship with the Soviet Union.

Learning to Live with Disagreements

In the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, America has never changed its positions on Jerusalem, borders, and settlements, although over the years there have been different points of emphasis. UN Security Council Resolution 242, which the Palestinians are now trying to change, clearly recognized Israel's need for secure and defensible borders, and certainly not the wholesale withdrawal of Israel to the former "green line." President Reagan said this is something that Israel should never be asked to do.

Even the Bush-Baker Administration, when Yitzhak Shamir was prime minister, never declared the settlements to be illegal. They went about exploring the question in an orderly fashion by asking the Legal Counsel of the White House to give an opinion, and the opinion was that they were not illegal. From that day onward, the U.S. used the term "obstacle to peace," but not "illegal."

Over the years, construction in the territories, and certainly in Jerusalem, continued at full strength. As a result, the U.S. and Israel agreed that certain amounts were to be deducted from U.S. loan guarantees. Both countries lived with that, and it is an example of how, under certain circumstances, things can be worked out in spite of the basic position of the United States.

At the beginning of this administration, it said everything depended on whether Israel does or does not build across the "green line." Opposing Jewish construction in the "territories" has been the traditional American approach going back to 1967, but it was never, with few exceptions, the only focus of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. By supporting that argument, especially at the beginning, the administration can be faulted for raising Palestinian expectations, so that even Abbas finds it very difficult to back down.

After the U.S. Midterm Elections

Now we are after the U.S. midterm elections. Constitutionally, foreign policy is the domain of the president, not Congress, but the president does not act in a vacuum. Congress has powers to restrain and to expand, and sometimes it does influence administration policies.

Congress is friendly to Israel, however, and this does make a certain imprint on the relationship. Among other things, the members of the unofficial Jewish caucus, who are mostly Democrats, were almost all re-elected. This means that their proportionate weight inside the Democratic group in the House of Representatives is actually greater than it was in the past. In addition, many Republicans were elected or re-elected who are indeed friends of Israel.

Furthermore, the new committee heads of the more important committees are decidedly pro-Israel, though their predecessors were just as pro-Israel. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, who is going to head the House Foreign Affairs Committee, is a proven friend and supporter of Israel, as was the outgoing chairman, Howard Berman, so I don't really see a major shift. Some other committees which deal with America's own anti-terrorist effort or with arms exports are in the hands of people who not only support Israel but understand, from their point of view, the importance of the relationship between the American people and the Israeli people. I do not see a change but rather a continuation under somewhat more favorable terms for Israel.

However, do we really want a weakened American presidency, which means a weakened America, especially in the Middle East where the only possible alternative to a weakened America is a strengthened Iran? Basically, Israel wants and needs a strong American presidency. Israel needs a close relationship with the number one power because there can be no vacuum in international politics. We have seen the attempts by Turkey, Brazil, and others to replace American dominance, which does not work in Israel's favor.

Even though this president may sometimes have a view of the world and of history which is not necessarily linked to reality, I believe that the basic ingredients of the U.S.-Israel relationship have not been weakened, nor have the common political and strategic interests of both countries.

The Search for Peace

There have been many precedents over the years of American initiatives in the Middle East which did not bring any results. I think one may assume that an American initiative which is not supported by a consensus in Israel does not have much chance of creating a breakthrough. Why should President Obama and his administration court potential failure again? It may also be in Israel's interest that the approach to an Israeli-Palestinian agreement become more nuanced - that talks will go on, agreements will be made, the economic situation in the territories will be improved, and security measures will be coordinated. Whether this will actually lead to the end of the conflict, I personally have grave doubts.

The Palestinians now want the UN Security Council to adopt a new resolution which will not officially eliminate 242 but supersede it. It will not include the definition of secure borders mentioned in 242 or refer to how Israel should not withdraw from all the territories, but is expected to demand an Israeli withdrawal in order to create a Palestinian state.

If the Palestinian proposal passes, this would create a new reality and put an end to the peace process. The peace process depends on the agreed formula of 242, and the Oslo Agreement is still the legal framework, the result of many previous negotiations. If all that is done away with, then we are not back to square one but before square one. Israel could act militarily against any moves which violate previous agreements. America, which sees itself as the patron of the peace process, should certainly not give its support to something which would do away altogether with the agreed framework of the peace process. If that is done away with, neither peace nor any sort of interim solution is likely.

One issue has definitely been resolved by the declaration of the Prime Minister of Israel, heading a Likud-based government, in support of a Palestinian state - the so-called two-state solution. That is something which is quite different from anything which had gone before. Prime Minister Netanyahu believes he can achieve an agreement with the Palestinians, and wants to move forward. He wants an agreement even if it is a framework or partial agreement, because he, better than many others before him, realizes the grave dangers facing Israel from Iran.

The Palestinian issue is not just a political issue but also a security one. Where will the borders be? How will Israel maintain its security position in the Jordan Valley, especially with a growing threat from Iran inside Iraq - meaning a growing threat on Israel's eastern front?

Recently Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made a statement to a Palestinian-American group that she is optimistic about the peace process in spite of the problems, and that maybe an agreement will not be reached in our time but in the time of our children. This was quite amazing coming from Hillary Clinton, but maybe those in Washington are more aware than they were a year ago that this is not an issue which can be solved quickly. Both Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Obama may come to some sort of pragmatic working relationship, because basically they need each other in order to succeed, or at least not to be seen as abject failures.


Therefore, the relationship between the United States of America and Israel will go on with its ups and downs, but it will not break.

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Ambassador Zalman Shoval, a member of the Board of Overseers of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, served as Israel's Ambassador to the United States from 1990 to 1993 and from 1998 to 2000. A veteran member of Israel's Knesset (1970-1981, 1988-1990), Ambassador Shoval was a senior aide to the late Moshe Dayan during his tenure as foreign minister in the Begin government, including during the first Camp David conference. This Jerusalem Issue Brief is based on his presentation to the Institute for Contemporary Affairs of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs on November 11, 2010.