From the moment it was revealed that a deal had been made to release Gilad Shalit, discussions began in Israel and elsewhere over the question of whether it would advance or hinder the peace process between us and the Palestinians. There were those who said it wouldn't advance or hinder anything, as there is no peace process so long as Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas maintains his intransigent positions. The Fatah leadership and the man who heads it had a moment of glory (at least in the eyes of the Palestinian public), after the latter submitted a request for the recognition of statehood at the U.N. Yet this moment, like many moments of glory, passed quickly when Palestinians in the territories and refugee camps realized that an independent state is still far off.
At this stage, Abbas' petition is going nowhere. The U.S. may not even need to use its veto power at the Security Council to thwart the bid. But what must have dimmed the luster of the Palestinian Authority even more is the Palestinian public's perception, right or not, that Hamas garnered an achievement with the Shalit prisoner swap deal.
Hamas leaders believe their organization has been significantly strengthened and they are planning their future political steps accordingly. First and foremost, of course, they plan to overtake - either immediately or gradually - the Palestinian Authority. In addition, Hamas expects its parent organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, to make gains in elections in Egypt, which will also strengthen its position on the Palestinian street. The state of affairs in the Middle East is so fragile that you never know what tomorrow will bring (there is no guarantee, for example, that the military regime in Egypt actually plans to relinquish the reins of power). However, if Hamas' predictions come true, the chances for a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians will be significantly diminished.
A U.N.-sponsored Palestinian state seems to be moving further away (and this is also apparently the view of Salam Fayyad and the Palestinian lobby in Washington, which opposed the U.N. initiative). Not only is the Palestinian Authority's relationship with the U.S. administration and Congress at a low point, it stands to lose the Palestinian leadership to its sworn enemy, Hamas.
Politics is usually not a zero-sum game. With all the justified anger in Israel over Abbas' conduct, we of course do not have cause to celebrate the increased political stature of an anti-Semitic organization such as Hamas, whose charter calls for our destruction as a people and a state. Recent developments require us to thoroughly and constantly examine all the possible options, among them: an effort to renew negotiations, despite the negative data; a return to the "status quo" (which won't be easy considering the situation in the Middle East); unilateral steps on Israel's part or interim agreements. Or perhaps there are other ways.
The Quartet recently urged Israel and the Palestinians to relaunch negotiations. Israel acceded to the request. Abbas, meanwhile, reiterated his mantra that the condition for renewed talks is a complete halt of Israeli construction beyond the Green Line, including in Jerusalem, and the recognition of the 1967 lines as the border of a future Palestinian state.
That was before the Shalit deal. Will the new reality that has emerged (at least temporarily) make the official Palestinian leadership recognize that its initiative at the U.N. and refusal to return to negotiations without preconditions were mistakes? Or will it again justify Abba Eban's famous saying that the "Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity?"
